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STUDENT NOTES
COPYRIGHT OF STATUTE COMPILATIONS
Since most publications of statutes are copyrighted, a question
is raised as to the effect of such a copyright. This situation would
appear to be analogous to the copyright of a publication of court
decisions, since the substantive part of both publications is the
result of the work of state officers m their official capacity, and as
a matter of public policy both must be readily available to the
citizens of the state. For a substantiation of this analogy, we must
look to the cases.
Numerous cases have been decided determining the effect of a
copyright of court reports. Banks v. Manchester' pointed out that
the opinions of the court were not copyrightable by the reporter, the
reason being that these opinions were written by judges of the state
in their official capacity and thereby became public property accessible to anyone. However, in Callaghanv. Myers2 the Supreme Court
held that a reporter of the opinions of courts could obtain a copyright of his work as an author, but it was again stated that this
copyright did not give the reporter an exclusive right in the opinions themselves. Copyright protection covered only the parts of the
publication of which the reporter was clearly the author. The prmciples of these cases have been followed in many cases dealing with
copyright of court reports, and the law in that field is relatively well
settled. On the other hand, very few cases have been found dealing
with the effect of a copyright of statutes.
The first case involving an alleged infringement of the copyright of a publication of statutes was Davidson v. Wheelock.' In this
case the court declared that statutes were public records which could
be compiled and published by anyone. If a copyright of the statutes were permitted, the person obtaining the copyright might suppress any publication of them. This would be contrary to the public
interest as everyone is presumed to know the laws, and must, therefore, have a method of determining what those laws are. However,
it was recognized here that a compiler rmght have some copyrightable interest in his compilation of the statutes, but this was only
dictum as the court held that there was no infringement. Howell v.
Miller' was the next case dealing with a copyright of a statute compilation. This case was in direct accord with Davidson v. Wheelock,"
128 U. S. 244, 9 Sup. Ct. 36 (1888).
2 128 U. S. 617, 9 Sup. Ct. 177 (1888)
'27 Fed. 61 (1866)
'91 Fed. 129 (1898)
127 Fed. 61 (1866) cited supra note 3.
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holding that there could be no copyright of the statutes themselves,
and recognizing the dictum that the compiler nught have a copyrightable interest in his publication.
In G. T. Bisel Co. v. Welsh protection was extended to a copyright of a statute compilation for the first time, with the result that
the dictum of the Wheelock case became law. The court held that
any portions of the publication which were the fruits of the compiler's labor would be protected by the copyright. It was again repeated that the compiler had no interest susceptible of copyright in
the statutes themselves. The principles of this case were recognized
and applied again in W H. Anderson Co. v. Baldwin Law Publishing Co.7 where a copyright of a statute compilation was protected.
Conceding then that a compiler of statutes has an interest which
may be copyrighted, a question naturally presented is, what specific
portions of the compilation can be protected by a copyright?
Examples of copyrightable interests may be found in the cases
already cited. For instance, the arrangement or combination may
be so original as to be protected,8 and this would seem to include an
original numbering system. However, a use of the same numbering
system by a subsequent compiler would not constitute an infringement if such system were used parenthetically to show the derivation
of the particular statutes' or if the system had been made official by
the legislature.
Copying of the annotations," or headnotes and
cross-referencesP constitutes an infringement of the compiler's copyright. Likewise the index of the compiler would come under the
protection of the copyright as would any other parts of the publication which could be said to be the result of the compiler's efforts.
Another interesting phase of these particular copyright cases is
the substance and effect of the evidence used to prove copying. Two
types of evidence are particularly conducive toward influencing a
decision of infringement. First, several indentical errors in the
publications are almost conclusive of copying." Second, substantial
similarities in the two publications are indicative of copying and
have a cumulative effect, that is, the more instances of similarities
which can be shown, the stronger is the presumption of copying. '
It must be pointed out that this evidence creates only a presumption
of copying which the accused may rebut.
6131 Fed. 564 (1904).
'27 Fed. (2d) 82 (1928).
'Howell v. Miller, 91 Fed. 129 (1898).

' Ibid.
"W H. Anderson Co. v. Baldwin Law Publishing Co., 27 Fed.
(2d) 82 (1928).
"Ibid.
"G. T. Bisel Co. v Welsh, 131 Fed. 564 (1904).
"Ibzd.
21W H. Anderson Co. v. Baldwin Law Publishing Co., 27 Fed.
(2d) 82 (1928).
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In summary, the following general conclusions concerning the
effect of a copyright of a statute compilation are apparent from the
few cases decided on tis question: although the statutes themselves
are not copyrightable as a matter of public policy, the portions of
the compilation which- are deemed to be the fruits of the compiler's
labor, such as annotations, headnotes, cross-references, arrangement,
or index, will be protected by a copyright.
ROBERT M. SPRAGENS
BAR OF THE DEBT AS AFFECTING THE MORTGAGE
When the Statute of Limitations has run against a debt secured
by a mortgage, a question arises as to whether the mortgagee may
proceed on the mortgage for the amount of the debt. The answer
apparently depends on two factors: (1) whether the running of the
Statute of Limitations entirely extinguishes the debt itself or
merely the personal liability of the mortgagor and (2) whether the
situation affords the mortgagee two separate and distinct remedies,
one on the mortgage against the land and the other against the
mortgagor personally
As to the effect of the Statute of Limitations, the great majority
of courts hold that where the period provided by the statute for
the bringing of the action has elapsed, the debt itself is not extinguished; the statute merely bars the remedy of the obligee to sue
on the personal obligation.' The mortgagee, therefore, may proceed to recover the same by any other remedy he may have.
The great majority of the courts agree that the mortgage and
the debt it secures are separate obligations. It is said that the
mortgagee has two remedies, one in personam against the mortgagor and one n rem against the land.3 The personal action against
the mortgagor usually must be brought within a comparatively short
period of time, depending upon the provisions of the statute. However, since the right to hold the mortgage as security and proceed
against the land for the amount of the debt is a right 7n rem, the
mortgagee has a longer period in which to bring is action to enforce
this remedy because in most states the Statute of Limitations does
not run against land for a period of fifteen or twenty years. In some
states the period for recovery on mortgages is prescribed by statute.'
Am. Jur., Limitation of Actions, sec. 11.
'Hardin v. Boyd, 113 U.S. 756, 28 L. Ed. 1141 (1884), Austin v.
Edwards, 201 Ala. 532, 78 So. 886 (1918)" Pratt v. Huggins, 29 Barb.
(N. Y.) 277 (1859). Hulbert v. Clark, 128 N.Y. 295, 28 N.E. 638, 14
L.R.A.
59 (1891).
3
Belknap v. Gleason, 11 Conn. 160, 27 Am. Dec. 721 (1835),
Maloney v. Home Loan & Trust Co., 97 Ind. App. 564, 186 N.E. 897
(1933)
'Austin v. Steele, 68 Ark. 348, 58 S.W 352 (1900), London &
S.F Bank v. Bandmann, 120 Cal. 220, 52 Pac. 583, 65 Am. St. Rep.
179 (1898).
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